ere has been increasing interest in adopting BlockChain (BC), that underpins the crypto-currency Bitcoin, in Internet of ings (IoT) for security and privacy. However, BCs are computationally expensive and involve high bandwidth overhead and delays, which are not suitable for most IoT devices. is paper proposes a lightweight BC-based architecture for IoT that virtually eliminates the overheads of classic BC, while maintaining most of its security and privacy bene ts. IoT devices bene t from a private immutable ledger, that acts similar to BC but is managed centrally, to optimize energy consumption. High resource devices create an overlay network to implement a publicly accessible distributed BC that ensures end-to-end security and privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Internet of ings (IoT) has a broad range of applications including smart grids, smart cities [5] , and health management [7] . However, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. the increasingly invisible, dense and pervasive collection, processing and dissemination of data in the midst of people's private lives gives rise to serious security and privacy concerns. Several intrinsic features of IoT amplify its security and privacy challenges including: lack of central control, heterogeneity in device resources, multiple a ack surfaces, context speci c risks, and scale.
In this paper, we argue that BlockChain (BC) technology that underpins Bitcoin, the rst cryptocurrency system launched in 2008 [10] , can provide an e ective solution to IoT privacy and security. BC security mainly comes from a cryptographic puzzle known as Proof of Work (POW) used for appending (mining) new blocks into the BC. BC also o ers a high level of privacy by using a changeable Public Key (PK) as the users' identity. BC has been adopted for a number of non-monetary applications, e.g. proof of location [2] , distributed storage systems [12] , and health care data [13] . ese salient features of BC make it a ractive for delivering distributed privacy and security in IoT. However, applying BC to IoT is not straightforward. Several key challenges need to be addressed including: (i) high resource requirements due to the use of POW; (ii) scalability issues that originate from the need to achieve consensus among miners; (iii) high delays a ributed to POW and mechanisms to prevent double spending (which may be important for cryptocurrency yet not for IoT).
e main contribution of this paper is to introduce a new type of BC that is optimized for IoT. To exemplify our idea, we use the scenario of a smart home in the rest of the paper. However, the architecture is application-agnostic for diverse IoT use cases. Our lightweight instantiation of BC retains the underlying privacy and security bene ts, while eliminating the aforementioned issues. We adopt a hierarchical structure to optimize resource consumption and increase network scalability. Our framework consists of three tiers which are: smart home, overlay network, and cloud storage. IoT devices in the smart home bene t from a private Immutable Ledger (IL), that acts similar to BC but is managed centrally, and symmetric encryption to reduce the processing overhead, while higher resource devices jointly create a distributed overlay that instantiates a public BC. Communications among entities in di erent tiers are known as transactions that are grouped into blocks. Blocks are appended to the BC without solving the POW, which decreases the appending overhead signi cantly. Veri ed signed transactions are available for the entire network immediately. is signi cantly reduces the delay of IoT transactions, such as data access or queries. A distributed trust method is employed in the overlay to decrease the processing overhead in validating new blocks. We qualitatively discuss the robustness of the proposed method against a acks, and we evaluate the packet and processing overhead quantitatively through simulations. e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews IoT privacy and security and introduces the basic concepts of Bitcoin BC. Section 3 discusses the proposed architecture. Details of transaction handling are discussed in Section 4. Analysis and evaluation is presented in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Privacy and security in IoT
Security in IoT is challenging due to low resource capabilities of the vast majority of devices, immense scale, heterogeneity among the devices, and lack of standardization. Moreover, many of these IoT devices collect and share large amounts of data from our personal spaces, thus opening up signi cant privacy concerns. To protect user's privacy, the authors in [1] de ned di erent privacy zones for diverse types of data. Each zone has an associated context based policy checking method, that is checked by a Home Security Hub prior to accepting join or re-join requests to protect user data against unauthorized data sharing. However, the possibility of accessing smart devices directly bypassing the hub is not considered.
Authors in [11] demonstrated that a wide variety of o -the-shelf IoT devices lack fundamental security considerations. e authors proposed a Security Management Provider that is responsible for controlling access to data and devices by using xed or dynamic content-based policies. However, protecting user privacy while revealing personal data is not addressed. A comprehensive study on IoT security appears in [8] . In the context of smart homes, the authors discussed the security implications involved in sensor distribution, data capture, and forwarding data to the gateway.
As proposed in [3] by using safe or aggregated answers the user can send as li le data as possible to the service provider. In some instances, their proposed method may even add noise to the data to ensure privacy. Although these methods improve data privacy, for some applications, expressly in a smart home se ing, the noisy version of the data may lead to inaccurate services.
In summary, despite recent proposals for providing security and privacy in IoT, three challenges still need to be addressed:
• Resource optimization: Resource constrained devices in IoT are not suited for high level, complex security methods.
• Privacy: Protecting user privacy while revealing diverse types of data.
• Centralization: Centralized methods tend to be inappropriate for IoT and bring the challenges of single point of failure, many-to-one tra c, and reduced scalability.
Bitcoin BC
BC is an immutable ledger of blocks that underpins Bitcoin and maintains network transactions. Network participants, that are known by a changeable Public Key (PK), manage the BC in a distributed manner. ere are certain nodes that are responsible for appending new blocks to the BC. ese nodes are called miners and the appending process is called mining. Bitcoin mining involves solving a resource consuming cryptographic puzzle known as Proof of Work (POW). BC is an a ractive technology for addressing the mentioned security and privacy challenges in IoT as a result of its key features including decentralization, anonymity and security.
Authors in [6] proposed a BC-based multi-tier method to share IoT users' data with organizations and people. However, they assume that IoT devices have su cient resources for solving the POW which may not always be true. In fact, solving the POW for Bitcoin requires very sophisticated hardware and cannot be achieved even using o -the-shelf computers. Adopting BC in IoT is not straightforward and will require addressing the critical challenges of high resource, latency, bandwidth utilization and low scalability. is paper takes a step in this direction.
3 BC-BASED SMART HOME ARCHITECTURE e proposed architecture, shown in Figure 1 , includes three tiers, namely the smart home, the overlay, and the cloud storage. In each tier, entities use transactions to communicate with each other. In the following we brie y introduce three tiers.
Smart home
e smart home is comprised of IoT devices, local IL, and a local storage as shown in the bo om le of Figure 1 . Each home has a local private IL that is similar to a BC but is managed centrally by the smart home manager (SHM). e SHM processes all incoming and outgoing transactions and uses a shared key for local communications with IoT devices and local storage. e local IL maintains a policy header de ned by the home owner to authorize the received transactions. Local devices inside the home or overlay nodes might generate transactions in order to share, request, or store data. Our previous work [4] discusses the smart home tier in greater detail.
Overlay
e overlay is a peer-to-peer network that brings the distributed feature to our architecture. e constituent nodes, known as overlay nodes, could be SHMs, other high resource devices in the home, or the user's smartphone or personal computer. To decrease network overhead and delay, nodes in the overlay are grouped in clusters and each cluster elects a Cluster Head (CH) using methods such as in [9] . Each CH has a unique PK, known by other CHs in the overlay, used for generating new blocks so that other CHs could authorize the block generator. Each node is free to change its cluster if it experiences excessive delays. Moreover, nodes in the cluster can elect a new CH at any time. In this paper, it is assumed that the aforementioned steps are performed at start-up. Each CH maintains the following lists:
PK of requesters: the list of PKs that are allowed to access data for the SHMs connected to this cluster. An example of which might be a SP that provides certain services for the smart home devices.
PK of requestees: the list of PKs of SHMs connected to this cluster that are allowed to be accessed.
e overlay CHs maintain a public BC, which has a ledger for each overlay node that shows the history of transactions sent by the overlay user and is used to gain reputation. e transactions are generated by users or devices to request or share data with others.
e overlay has multisig transactions, meaning they need to be signed by two entities -requester and requestee to be treated as a valid transaction. Additionally, each transaction has two outputs which indicates the total number of accepted or rejected transactions, by the requestees, that are created by the generator of the current transaction.
Distributed Trust and POW elimination: We use distributed trust to ensure that the received blocks are valid and to decrease the overhead for verifying blocks compared to Bitcoin. is works as follows: A user that initially has no transaction history is suspected to be malicious and all his transactions are veri ed. To verify a transaction the rst step is to con rm that the requester has the right to append transactions to the speci ed ledger which is done by comparing the hash of the current transaction PK with the output PK of the previous transaction. Following this, the requester signature is veri ed using his PK in the transaction. Next, the veri er controls that only one of the outputs of the current transaction, i.e. the number of successful transactions or the number of rejected transactions, is increased only by one. If the steps passed successfully, the transaction is veri ed.
In the overlay network each CH maintains a trust rating for other CHs based on direct and indirect evidence. CH A has direct evidence about CH B if it veri ed a block generated by B. If A receives a block generated by B and A has no trust in B, but one or more CHs signed the block as a valid block, then A has indirect evidence about B. When a CH generates a new block it has to create a multisig transaction which is used for evaluating trust. e CH then sends both the block and multisig transaction to its neighboring CHs. Neighbor CHs check the multisig transaction for direct or indirect evidence. If the neighbor CH has direct evidence with the block generator or other CHs who signed the multisig transaction, then it randomly veri es a portion of the transactions in the block by checking their signatures. e portion of transactions that need to be veri ed change as a function of the number of succesfully veri ed blocks for the corresponding CH. Figure 2 shows an example of such a "trust table". Note that, a certain portion of transactions must be veri ed even when a CH is deemed to be trustworthy to protect the network against CHs which may have been recently compromised. If a CH has no direct evidence with the block generator or those who signed it, then it checks all transactions in the received block.
If a single block is generated by more than one CH, then other CHs would accept the one that is appended by the CH which has the highest trust to decrease the validation processing overhead due to the act of distributed trust. is may result in a forked BC. However, all forked blocks are assumed to be valid. e CHs append newly received blocks to the longest chain of blocks which ensures BC consistency.
Cloud storage
e cloud storage groups user's data in identical blocks associated with a unique block-number. e block-number is used by the SHM for authentication along with the hash of stored data. If the storage can successfully locate data with the received block-number and hash from the SHM, then the user is authenticated. Received data packets from users are stored in a First-In-First-Out order in blocks along with the hash of stored data as shown in the bo om right of Figure 1 . It is worth noting that each home owner can either create di erent ledgers of data in storage for each of its devices or a single common ledger for all of its devices. e former is particularly useful if the owner wishes to provide access to all data of a particular device to a SP.
TRANSACTION HANDLING
In this section, we focus on how transactions are handled in our framework.
Storing
Let's assume that Alice has created an account in a cloud storage facility and set up permissions for her thermostat to upload data to this facility. During the bootstrapping process, the cloud storage returns a pointer to the rst block of data. When the smart thermostat needs to store data in the cloud storage, it sends its data to the SHM. A er checking permissions and extracting the previous block-number and hash from the local IL, the SHM creates a random ID and sends data to the storage with this ID. It is assumed that at any given time, two nodes cannot have the same ID. e storage checks the validity of the transaction by locating data using given parameters and also con rms that there is space available in the cloud storage. If so, it calculates a hash of received data packets and compares it with the received hash in the transaction. If the two hashes match, then data packets are stored in the storage and the new block-number is encrypted with the SHM PK, to make sure that only the true SHM can read the new block-number, and sent to the SHM. Next, the signed hash of data is signed by the storage and sent to the overlay network to be stored in the overlay BC. is ensures that any further changes in the user's data are visible to all. In each smart home there is a private secure storage managed by the SHM. e SHM distributes a shared key between authorized IoT devices and the local storage. IoT devices use this key for generating store transaction. Local storage is managed by the owner of the home and is trusted. erefore, there is no additional overhead for accounting.
Accessing
To access stored data of a device, the SP creates and signs the requester part of a multisig transaction. e SP then sends this to its own CH. e CH checks both lists of PKs de ned in Section 3.2. If either the multisig transaction's requester is in the CH requester's key list, or the transaction's requestee is in its requestee's key list, then it broadcasts the transaction to its own cluster. Otherwise, the transaction is broadcast to other CHs. When the requestee (SHM) receives the multisig transaction, it authorizes the SP by checking the local policy in the local IL. If so, the SHM requests data from the storage, encrypts them with requester's PK, and sends them to the requester (the SP). A er sending data for the requester, the SHM should store the multisig transaction in the local IL to keep the history of transactions. In addition, the SHM sends the multisig transaction to its CH to be stored in the overlay BC as a history of requester transactions.
Monitoring
A monitor transaction is launched by overlay nodes to monitor realtime data of a device. Monitor transaction processing is similar to access transaction. e only di erence is that the SHM sends realtime data of requested device. A monitor transaction can also be used to set up continuous stream of real-time data from a particular device.
EVALUATION
In this section, we rst discuss the di erences between the proposed IL, overlay BC, and the Bitcoin BC. en, we present a qualitative discussion on how our proposed solution addresses common security and privacy a acks. In addition, we evaluate the associated overheads.
Recall that our framework optimizes the Bitcoin BC for IoT by presenting di erent tiers of BC. Each tier has unique features that makes it di er with other tiers and Bitcoin BC. We summarize the key di erences between our BCs and Bitcoin BC in Table 1 .
Security and privacy analysis
It is assumed that the adversary can be the CH, a device in the home, a node in the overlay, or the cloud storage. Adversaries are able to sni communications, discard transactions, create false transactions and blocks, change or delete data in storage, link a user's transactions to each other, and sign fake transactions to legitimize colluding nodes. However, they are not able to break the encryption. e main classes of threats are:
Accessibility threats that prevents the legitimate user from getting access to her data or services.
Anonymity threats that nds the real world identity of a user by analyzing the anonymous transactions and other publicly available information.
Authentication and access control threats in which the adversary tries to authenticate herself as a legitimate user in order to gain access to data.
We consider the following a acks that threaten accessibility: Denial of Service (DOS) A ack: In this a ack, the a acker sends a large number of transactions to a target to break its availability. e use of requester and requestee PK lists in the CHs in our architecture diminishes the e ect of this a ack as a packet would not be relayed to a SHM unless its key is on these two key lists. Moreover, if a CH receives several unsuccessful access requests from a particular PK, it can block that PK by removing the corresponding key from the CH key lists. However, the adversary can succeed in a DOS a ack if it uses di erent PKs for the a ack.
Modi cation A ack: In this a ack the adversary may seek to change or delete stored data for a particular user. To launch this a ack, the adversary would have to compromise the cloud storage security. However, the target user would be able to detect any change in his stored data by comparing hash of the data in the cloud with stored hash in its local IL as discussed in Section 3.2.
Dropping A ack: To launch this a ack, the adversary should have control over a CH(s) and then drop all received transactions and blocks. Such an a ack would be detected since nodes that belong to the constituent clusters would not receive any transactions or service from the overlay. In this instance, they would elect a new CH.
Appending A ack: To launch this a ack, the adversary must control multiple CHs that work cooperatively. To increase the indirect evidence rating, the malicious CHs sign the multisig transaction along with the block claiming that they have veri ed the block. e fake block might be a block with either one or more than one false transaction. In the proposed trust method a random portion of transactions in a received block are always validated based on the trust level between the CH and the block generator. erefore, even if more than 51% of CHs in the overlay signs the current block as valid, there is still possibility that the honest CH detects the false block (this a ack is called 51% a ack in Bitcoin). Our framework exhibits graceful degradation in that the resilience degrades as the number of compromised nodes increases. e probability of detecting the fake block is a function of the number of total CHs, which presents an interesting trade-o for the system designer.
To break user anonymity, an a acker may try to deanonymize a user by linking di erent data associated with the same anonmyous identity. To protect against such linking a acks, overlay nodes can use di erent PKs for their communications with overlay nodes or cloud storage, so that each single transaction would have a unique ID and it would not be possible to link them together.
e next class of threats is against authentication and access control. It has been shown in recent research [11] that it is possible for an a acker to take control of a smart home device or introduce a fake device to a home network. Our design employs a hierarchical defence against these a acks. First, there is a central SHM that controls all incoming and outgoing packets and prevents smart home devices from being directly accessed from the Internet. If the SHM detects a packet that does not adhere to the policies de ned by the owner, the packet is dropped. e second defence is that all devices in the home are required to have a genesis transaction in IL that allows them to initiate communication with the SHM and other devices. A device without a corresponding genesis transaction is isolated from the network. is prevents an a acker from introducing unauthorized devices to the network.
Performance evaluation
In this section, we rst quantitatively evaluate various overheads, then, we discuss simulation results. Table 2 illustrates average performance metrics for the key transactions in our proposed architecture.
ese are expressed as a function of various design parameters such as packet, memory and computation overhead and delay.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed framework, we conduct simulations using NS3 simulator, focusing on the overlay network. Note that the smart home performnace was evaluated in our previous work [4] . We simulate a network of 50 nodes, of which 13 are CHs, to study tra c and processing overhead of our design. We run the simulation for 60 seconds during which a total of 960 transactions are created. e given results are the average of 10 runs of the simulation. is refers to the amount of bytes transmi ed in the overlay for managing the public BC. To compare our results, a Bitcoin network with 50 nodes is simulated as the baseline. Simulation results show that our method generated roughly 37MB data while Bitcoin generated 138MB data. e main reason for this di erence is due to clustering and the fact that the BC packets are only broadcast between CHs while in Bitcoin packets are broadcast to all nodes.
Processing overhead: is metric refers to the time consumed by CHs to verify new blocks. As a benchmark, we consider an overlay network with 50 nodes but which does not implement distributed trust. Simulation results for evaluating the processing overhead are presented in Figure 3 . Initially, the processing time is equal for both methods as there is no trust between CHs. As more blocks are generated by the CHs, our distributed trust strategy kicks in whereby only a portion of the transactions in new blocks need to be validated. Consequently, the processing overhead with our method is lower than the method without trust. In our method, once 50 blocks are generated, the trust rating between CHs reaches the highest level. From here on the number of transactions that need to be veri ed for each new block remains xed and thus the processing time remains steady. Overall, our method decreases the processing time roughly by 50%. It should be noted that the distributed trust strategy presented in this paper could also be employed in other BC based systems provided it does not compromise network security. 
CONCLUSION
BlockChain (BC) holds promise for privacy and security in IoT. However, applying BC in IoT is not straightforward due to various associated challenges including: high resource consumption, scalability, and processing time. In this paper, we proposed an optimized BC that eliminates the overhead associated with the classic BC while retaining its security and privacy bene ts. e proposed BC requires no mining and thus incurs no additional delays in processing generated transactions. It employs a hierarchical architecture that uses a centralized private Immutable Ledger (IL) at the local IoT network level to reduce overhead, and a decentralized public BC at higher end devices for stronger trust. A distributed trust method is employed to decrease new block processing overhead. Security and privacy of the design is evaluated that showing the robustness of the new architecture against several a acks. Simulation results demonstrate that the method has low packet and processing overhead. Future work includes more extensive evaluation of the impact of design choices on security and overhead in the overlay, and a comprehensive analysis on consensus and security of our framework. 1 
